The Sato-Crutchfield equations are studied analytically and numerically. The Sato-Crutchfield formulation is corresponding to losing memory. Then Sato-Crutchfield formulation is applied for some different types of games including hawk-dove, prisoner's dilemma and the battle of the sexes games. The Sato-Crutchfield formulation is found not to affect the evolutionarily stable strategy of the ordinary games. But choosing a strategy becomes purely random independent on the previous experiences, initial conditions, and the rules of the game itself. Sato-Crutchfield formulation for the prisoner's dilemma game can be considered as a theoretical explanation for the existence of cooperation in a population of defectors.
Introduction
Evolutionary game theory [1] is one of the important topics in Mathematics. Also it has many applications in Biology, Sociology and Economics. Generally a game consists of a group of players (of which two players at each game) are interacting with each other obtaining payoffs. Every player is allowed to choose some strategies, according to some rules. There are many different types of games. Each of them has its own rules, strategies, properties and applications.
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) [1] is an important concept in population dynamics. Consider a population in which each individual adopts one of k possible strategies (I j , j = 1, 2, ..., k). A strategy I * is ESS if for all I j = I * (yet close to it), then where A is the k × k payoff matrix. Recently, Sato and Crutchfield [2] have introduced a new formulation that is corresponding to mistakes or losing memory.
Our aim is to study Sato-Crutchfield formulation both analytically and numerically. Stability and persistence of the solutions are studied. The persistence of a dynamical system [3] is defined as follows:
Definition 1: A dynamical system is persistent if all cases where all u i (0) > 0 lead to lim
Also, we study the Sato-Crutchfield formulation for some different types of two-player games including hawk-dove (HD), prisoner's dilemma (PD) and the battle of the sexes games [1] . The Sato-Crutchfield formulation is shown not to affect the ESS of the ordinary games. But in some limit, choosing a strategy becomes random independent of the rules of the game and the initial conditions. The paper is organized as follow: In section 2, the Sato-Crutchfield formulation is explained. Both analytical and numerical results are added. The Sato-Crutchfield equations is applied to HD game in section 3. Also the effect on ESS is studied. Section 4 is devoted for studying the Sato-Crutchfield for PD game and some of its modifications. In section 5, the Sato-Crutchfield equations are introduced to the battle of the sexes. Some conclusions are summarized in section 6.
Sato-Crutchfield formulation
Recently Sato and Crutchfield [2] have studied the dynamics of learning in multiagent systems, where the agents use reinforcement learning. They showed that, although the agents are not directly interacting with each other, a collective game arises between them through their interaction with environment. Such interactions can be modelled via replicator type equations.
Consider two agents u and v with n possible actions, let u j (t) (v j (t)) be a measure of the probability that the agent u(v) will take action j at time t. Sato and Crutchfield have shown that u j (t), v j (t) satisfy the following equations
where A and B are payoff (reward) matrices for u and v, respectively, and α 1 , α 2 , β 1 , β 2 are nonnegative constants. If α 1 = α 2 = 0, then one regains the standard asymmetric replicator equations [1, 4] . We will comment on the case α 1 = α 2 = α > 0. For simplicity only the symmetric case will be considered (
Rescaling time to set β 1 = 1, the system becomes
Restricting to the region u i ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, then This means that even bad strategies will be adopted by some agents. To study this analytically assume a 2 > a 1 > 0. In the case that α = 0, it is known that the best strategy is u 2 = 1, u 1 = 0 so for small α, we find
The solution (4) is asymptotically stable if
The persistence of all strategies can be understood intuitively by realizing that α > 0 means memory decay [2] . This implies that some individuals may not know which is the best strategy hence they choose the bad strategy. Furthermore as α increases, u 1 , u 2 become close to each other, since more agents lose their memory. This agrees with the numerical simulations shown in Fig. (1) . Both u 1 and u 2 go to 0.5 for large α. At this point agents chose their strategies randomly without any regard to previous experiences.
Sato-Crutchfield formulation for hawk-dove game
The hawk-dove game [1] is a two-player game, where each player is allowed to use the hawk strategy (H) or the dove strategy (D). It has many biological and economic applications. The payoff matrix is given as follows
where g is the value of gain and c is the cost of fight. The max-min solution of von Neumann et al. [5] is to follow the D strategy for 0 < g < c. If 0 < c ≤ g, then the max-min solution is to follow the H policy. But this solution is not evolutionary stable, since a mutant adopting H strategy will gain much, this will encourage others to adopt the H policy. This will continue till the fraction of adopting the H policy (u 1 ) becomes large enough to make the payoffs of both strategies equal, thus
Applying the Sato-Crutchfield equations to HD game, the replicator equation becomes
where u 2 = 1 − u 1 is the D density. This case is numerically investigated for various values for g and c, see Fig. ( 2) for g = 1 and c = 4. The system is updated for 10 5 time steps. The behavior of u 1 is studied versus α. As shown in Fig. (2) , at α = 0, u 1 = 1/4 in agreement with its ordinary value Eq. (7). As α increases, u 1 increases rapidly and becomes close to 0.5. Therefore, for large α, agents choose their strategies (H or D) randomly with equal probabilities. This behavior is independent on the initial conditions.
Sato-Crutchfield formulation does not affect the ESS. For example, consider the hawk(H)-dove(D)-retaliate(R) game, where the payoff matrix is given by
Let u 1 (u 2 ) be the fraction of population adopting H (D) strategy, and u 3 = 1 − u 1 − u 2 is the R-density. Then Sato-Crutchfield equations for the HDR game become
It is known that for α = 0, the ESS is R. This means the solution u 1 = u 2 = 0 is asymptotically stable. Also, for α > 0, the ESS is R, and the solution (u 1 = u 2 = 0, u 3 = 1) is asymptotically stable. Beginning from nonzero values for u 1 , u 2 and u 3 , and for α > 0, the system always evolves to a state at which u 1 = u 2 = u 3 = 1/3. At this point, selecting a strategy becomes random with equal probabilities. But beginning from a zero value for the density of a strategy, it will not grow through the population.
Losing memory and the prisoner's dilemma game
The existence of cooperation in a group of selfish individuals is an interesting problem in mathematics and social sciences. One of the models of this phenomenon is the Prisoner's dilemma (PD) game [1] . In this case the available strategies are to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). The payoff matrix A is [(R, S), (T, P )], where T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S. For simplicity we take A = [(2, 0), (3, 1) ]. The standard solution gives the unrealistic conclusion that players should not cooperate. However cooperation has been shown to be a solution if the game is modified into iterated PD, or PD on the lattice, or memory PD [6, 7] . Recently another modification is given [8] , where a third strategy is introduced so the allowed strategies are C, D and loner (L). In this case, the payoff matrix is given as
where 2 > b > 1 and 1 > σ > 0. We call this game PDL game.
The Sato-Crutchfield equations for the PD game are
where u 1 is the defectors density and u 2 = 1 − u 1 is the cooperators density. It is known that for α = 0, the asymptotically stable strategy is (D) i.e. u 1 = 0, u 2 = 1. This has caused the following question to arise: How can cooperation exist in a population of defectors (selfish population)? SatoCrutchfield equations propose a new answer. Cooperation may arise due to memory loss which is equivalent to mistakes. But starting from a small number of cooperators in a defectors population what is the asymptotic ratio of cooperators? For very small positive α e.g. O(0.01) it is straightforward to see that the equilibrium solution is u 1 = exp(−1/α), u 2 = 1 − u 1 . This solution is asymptotically stable for very small α. But as α increases the solution approaches u 1 = u 2 = 0.5 (as we have argued before). Thus in Sato-Crutchfield equations a small number of cooperators in a population of defectors will increase to reach 50% of the population for α not too large, as shown in Fig. (3) . This is not the case for α = 0 where it is known that cooperation will eventually tend to zero. This shows the significant change between Sato-Crutchfield system and the corresponding replicator one. Applying Sato-Crutchfield equations to the PDL game, one gets
+α u 2 ln(
where u 1 is the fraction of cooperators, u 2 is the fraction of defectors and u 3 = 1 − u 1 − u 2 is the fraction of loners. For α = 0, it is direct to see that u 1 = u 2 = 0 is a neutral equilibrium for the system (13). For α > 0, all strategies coexist. Solving the system (13) numerically for α = 0.1, we get the fixed point (0.266, 0.155, 0.579). This confirms our conclusion that SatoCrutchfield equations is an interesting approach to introduce cooperation in prisoner's dilemma type games. As α increases, the choice between the three strategies becomes random with equal probabilities. Therefore u 1 , u 2 and u 3 tend to 1/3.
Sato-Crutchfield equations for the battle of the sexes
Recently, the war between the sexes was emphasizes as being important [9] . The battle of the sexes [10] is an asymmetric game that simulates the conflict between males and females concerning their respective shares in their parental investment. The female has two strategies coy or willing (fast) while the male can be either faithful or philanderer. The male (female) payoff matrix A(B) is gives as
Here we are applying the Sato-Crutchfield formulation to the battle of the sexes. The Sato-Crutchfield equations for the battle of the sexes are 
